The Independent Fear of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis, who now refer
to themselves the Islamic State) is the new uniting factor for states
in the Middle East and beyond who normally hate each other. The sudden
emergence of Isis's still expanding caliphate, with its terrifying blend
of brutality, bigotry and military effectiveness, provides a common
enemy for the US, Iran, EU states, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and, in Iraq,
Shia, Kurds and anti-Isis Sunni.
It was the capture of Mosul by Isis on 10 June which ended
the eight-year rule of Nouri al-Maliki, who withdrew his candidacy for a
third term as prime minister last Thursday. A diversity of Iraqi
politicians and parties, intermittently supported by foreign powers,
have been trying to get rid of him for years, but they failed because of
their disunity and his control of the Iraqi state. It was Isis gunmen
in their captured Humvees patrolling the roads an hour's drive from
Baghdad that created the determination to finally get rid of Mr Maliki.
However
deep the differences between Washington and Tehran, they were equally
horrified by the prospect of Isis advancing on Baghdad and Erbil. Saudi
Arabia has openly or covertly opposed Iran and Shia Islam since the
overthrow of the Shah in 1979, but is seriously threatened by Isis,
whose ideology is not much different from Saudi Wahhabism but challenges
the legitimacy of the house of Saud. Last Friday in Mecca, the
influential imam and preacher at the Grand Mosque, Sheikh Abdul-Rahman
al-Sudais, called for a code of conduct to stop leaders, scholars and
young people supporting violence and "terror". An implication of this is
that Saudi Arabia will suppress pro-jihadi propaganda on the internet
and satellite television which it has previously encouraged.
The
Iranians are also facing a more menacing future as Isis fighters
tighten their grip on Diyala province in Iraq, which is on the Iranian
border. A year ago a senior member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps explained how necessary it was for Iranian security to fight in
Damascus although it is 870 miles from Tehran; but last week Isis, which
considers Shia to be heretics worthy of death, captured the town of
Jalawla, 25 miles from Iran. No wonder Iran was willing to say goodbye
to Mr Maliki, whom it had so long defended, to end the political crisis
in Baghdad.
The realisation of the danger posed by Isis
did not come immediately with the fall of Mosul and Tikrit. In Baghdad,
and abroad, there was wishful thinking that Isis was the fanatical
shock-troop of an insurgent Sunni community in Iraq; and that once Mr
Maliki was gone and reforms acceptable to the Sunni were implemented,
then traditional tribal and non-Isis military leaders would reassert
themselves and get rid of the dangerous zealots.
It was
always a dubious argument, with much evidence to the contrary. Isis,
after its experience in 2006 and 2007 when the Americans did succeed in
splitting the Sunni insurgency, is wary of another stab in the back. It
has taken precautions such as demanding a pledge of allegiance to the
caliphate and, according to one account from Mosul, has seized 300
former Baathists and army officers as hostages. The lesson from Iraq and
Syria is that in places it has conquered, Isis only shares power as
long as it has to. So far, the chances of a counter-insurgency against
it in Sunni provinces look bleak.
But
this does not mean that Isis has not created a host of enemies for
itself, and it is losing the advantage of its opponents' disunity.
Within Iraq, relations between Erbil, the Kurdish capital, and Baghdad
were "poisonous", the Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, told me in
early July. But the victorious Isis attack on Kurdish-held territory in
August has made the Kurds less over-confident and more willing to
cooperate with the Iraqi central government against the jihadis. Among
the Kurds themselves there was a closing of the ranks as experienced
fighters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) raced to help the Iraqi
Kurdish forces with whom they had previously had hostile or very frosty
relations.
With both the Shia and the Kurds feeling
vulnerable, the US has restored much of its former influence in Iraq
with a few air strikes. In contrast with American ignorance and
arrogance in 2003, Washington is now much more knowledgeable and warier
of the Iraqi quagmire. As states such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran
find ferocious and battle-hardened Isis fighters on their borders, they
are more likely to cooperate with each other and the US. In the words of
Hillaire Belloc's poem, they're keeping "a-hold of Nurse, For fear of
finding something worse."
This coming together of old rivals and enemies in opposition
to Isis is happening in Iraq, but not yet in Syria where the US,
Europeans, Turks, Saudis and Qataris continue with their old bankrupt
policy. This is to get rid of or least weaken President Bashar al-Assad
by backing a moderate military opposition that is supposedly going to
fight both Mr Assad and Isis. Unfortunately, this group scarcely exists
except as a propaganda slogan and a consumer of subsidies from the Gulf.
Isis dominates the Syrian opposition and that domination grew greater
last week as it captured the towns of Turkmen Bareh and Akhtarin, 30
miles from Aleppo.
The Sunni rebellion in Syria may soon
be an Isis controlled project as it already is in Iraq. Given that Syria
is 60 per cent Sunni Arab, compared to 20 per cent in Iraq, it is
easier for Isis to increase its strength there. Any attempt to
counter-attack Isis that focuses solely on Iraq is likely to fail
because the caliphate straddles the two countries' border.
The
present US policy of leaving Mr Assad (backed by Hezbollah, Iran and
Russia) to battle Isis alone poses high risks, says Anthony Cordesman,
the national security analyst at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington. He writes that US policy only works
so long as the Assad forces do not lose territory and key cities to
Isis and the caliphate "does not make major economic, military,
political and religious gains". He adds that the present stance of the
US and its Arab allies assumes the existence of a moderate Sunni
resistance not dominated by Isis. If Isis is able to maintain its
"sanctuary" in eastern Syria, the caliphate will be able to reinforce
its "capabilities in Iraq and steadily increase the threat to Lebanon,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other neighbouring states".
In
practice, none of the conditions for a successful US policy in Syria
have been met. Since Isis expanded its caliphate to cover almost all of
eastern Syria, its neighbours have every reason to be frightened. The
nascent unity and cooperation of the opponents to Isis forged by the
Iraq crisis may be too little and too late.
'The Jihadis Return: Isis and the New Sunni Uprising' by Patrick Cockburn, published by OR Books, is available at orbooks.com
